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GOD,METAPROCEDURE,AND 
METAREALISM AT YALE 
Linda S. Mullenix* 
PROCEDURE. By Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss and Judith F. Res-
nik. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. 1988. Pp. xxv, 
1877. $43. 
Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School, ip. his memorial trib-
ute to his colleague Robert Cover, 1 describes the genesis of a casebook 
that would appear almost fifteen years later. In the summer of 1974, 
Professor Fiss was in Washington, D.C. to work on the Nixon im-
peachment hearings and Professor Cover was teaching at Georgetown. 
Professor Fiss decided to meet the Covers for a summer stroll, some 
ice cream, and some pleasant conversation. 
Professor Fiss' recollection of that evening's conversation uncan-
nily echoes the experience of many civil procedure teachers: 
Diane was with us and graciously feigned some interest in the conversa-
tion. Leah was not yet born, but Avi was there in his stroller. He made 
no pretense. He fell asleep the moment Bob and I started talking about 
what must have seemed the most boring of all subjects: procedure.2 
Professors Cover and Fiss' intense discussion concerning the na-
ture and function of procedur.e in the American judicial system gave 
birth to a vision of reforming procedural education in ~he law school 
curriculum. The particular passion of these professors, the scope of 
their vision, and their pedagogical commitment are evident in Profes-
sor Fiss' recollection of that evening: 
The walk was long and directionless. We must J:ia:ve covered every inch 
of the Washington Mall, ten times over. . . . Our immediate project was 
to revise the traditional first-year procedure course, and Bob, the true 
iconoclast in this endeavor, played with the idea of building a new course 
out of the proceeding then closing in on Richard Nixon. It didn't seem 
to matter to Bob that the presidential impeachment process had not been 
used for over a hundred years and probably would not be used for an-
• Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America Law School; B.A. 1971, City 
College of New York; M.Phil. 1974, Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University; J.D. 1980, Georgetown 
University Law Center. - Ed. 
1. Fiss, Tribute to Robert M Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1717 (1987). Professor Cover, Chancellor 
Kent Professor of Law and Legal History at Yale Law School, died in 1986. Tributes from his 
colleagues, friends, and students are collected at 96 YALE L.J. 1699 (1987). The volume also 
contains a series of essays in memory of Professor Cover, including one by his collaborator 
Judith Resnik. See Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987). 
2. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1717. 
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other. Nor did it seem to matter that an impeachment proceeding is the 
most rarefied form of legal practice imaginable and professionally in-
volves only a dozen or two lawyers in the entire nation. 3 
Steeped in the heady excitement of the presidential impeachment 
proceedings, Professors Cover and Fiss came very close to imposing 
this momentary historical event (as well as their enthusiasm) on gener-
ations of law students. This horse blinders approach to broader reali-
ties was explained by their philosophical commitment to a certain 
educational methodology: 
We paused, however, because we were both suckers for the "great case." 
Our preferred teaching method was to dwell on a single case for a long, 
long time (some say for an entire semester), using a single fact situation 
and a single legal encounter to explore the deepest and hardest issues of 
the law. The Nixon impeachment had not yet produced that kind of 
case, but the welfare rights movement had. We soon hit on Goldberg v. 
Kelly, and when we did, meta-procedure (as the students named it, to 
distinguish it from real procedure) was born. That was 1974.4 
In 1988, Procedure, the result of the collaborative efforts of Profes-
sors Cover, Fiss,5 and Judith Resnik,6 was finally published. Without 
a doubt this truly monumental casebook7 is legal education's publish-
ing event of the year. Not only is the book of great moment to civil 
procedure teachers, but it is a casebook that makes a dramatic state-
ment about late-twentieth-century legal education. The casebook's 
very title bespeaks its bold challenge to entrenched educational 
orthodoxies: it is not a text on civil procedure, nor on criminal proce-
dure, nor on administrative procedure - but on Procedure. It is a 
casebook distantly rooted in Dean Roscoe Pound's sociological juris-
prudence8 and the Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s.9 More 
3. Id. 
4. Id. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), remained the centerpiece of the collaborators' 
ensuing efforts over the years. Thus, in 1979, Professors Cover and Fiss explained: "We began 
with Goldberg v. Kelly, and in the years following we have revised the selection and arrangement 
of cases many times {though we have never considered abandoning Goldberg v. Kelly as the 
introductory case, even after the Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. Eldridge)." R. COVER 
& 0. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE vi (1979); see also (pp. 37-112). 
5. Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale Law School. 
6. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. 
7. The casebook runs 1824 pages, exclusive of tables of cases, articles, books, and other 
materials, and acknowledgements. It weighs in at a hefty 6 lbs. 11 oz. with a 3 inch binding, and 
can almost lay claim to the prize as the largest casebook on the market today. The winner of this 
competition (a close one) is P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM {3d ed. 1988) (1878 pages, 
exclusive of index). 
8. See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 
{1912). Professor Pound became dean of Harvard Law School in 1916. In the early 1900s, he 
urged legal educators to shift from teaching legal doctrine to exploring the social effects of legal 
principles and rules. He also was an early advocate of an interdisciplinary approach to legal 
study, suggesting that "the modem teacher of law should be a student of sociology, economics, 
and politics." L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, 45 {1986) (quoting Pound). 
9. See generally L. KALMAN, supra note 8; w. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
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than anything else, this casebook is a product of Yale. After almost 
fifty years of false starts, Yale finally has produced a realist casebook 
for proceduralists.10 Whether it will suffer the fate of other realist 
casebook ventures remains to be seen.11 Nonetheless, metaprocedure 
has, now formally arrived and for procedure teachers this presents the 
quite simple question: Metaprocedure - what is to be done? 
In a legal specialization normally lacking in intellectual excite-
ment, 1988 proved to be a stimulating year for proceduralists. This 
year marked the fiftieth anniversary of both the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure12 and the Erie decision, 13 events celebrated in no fewer than 
five academic conferences.14 Not coincidentally, a significant portion 
of one conference was devoted to an exploration of meta procedure and 
its implications for the law school curriculum.15 
The coalescence of these events in one year has generated excite-
ment, enthusiasm, skepticism, dismay, and despair. In the realm of 
procedure, eternal verities have proven less than eternal; the tradi-
tional canon is under attack; and intellectual pluralism reigns 
supreme. Senior professors have seen it all before;16 mid-career acade-
(1968). For a discussion of the impact of realism on law school curricula and casebooks, see 
infra text accompanying notes 56-92. 
10. Arguably, Professor Charles E. Clark made the first attempt at a realist procedure 
casebook. See c. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (1930). 
11. See L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 78-97. For a discussion of the realist casebook efforts, 
see infra text accompanying notes 71-98. 
12. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938 pursuant to congressional 
authority granted in the 1934 Rules Enabling Act. For an in-depth discussion of the genesis of 
the federal rules, see Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982); 
see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987). 
13. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
14. These conferences were: The 50th Anniversary of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
1938-1988 (Northeastern University School of Law, Oct. 7 & 8, 1988); Civil Rules Symposium 
(The University of Pittsburgh Law School, Sept. 30, 1988); American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS) Conference on Civil Procedure (University of Virginia, June 4-9, 1988); 50th 
Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Notre Dame Law School, Feb. 25-27, 
1988); The Golden Anniversary Year: Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules (Section 
on Civil Procedure, AALS Annual Meeting, Miami, Jan. 9, 1988). 
15. AALS Conference on Civil Procedure. Professor Resnik was a speaker at the conference 
and her remarks, as well as those of Professor William Eskridge of Georgetown University Law 
Center, were devoted to a discussion ofmetaprocedure. J. Resnik, Remarks at the AALS Con-
ference on Civil Procedure (June 6, 1988); W. Eskridge, Remarks at the AALS Conference on 
Civil Procedure (June 5, 1988). Procedure, the casebook, arrived during the second day of the 
conference along with the Foundation Press representative. A number of conference participants 
who had endured harrowing commuter flights from Dulles Airport to Charlottesville speculated 
about the pilot's requests for weight redistribution when the volumes of Procedure appeared for 
the shuttle flight. 
16. See Ecclesiastes 1:4-11. Surely there are professors who have lived long enough to wit-
ness the intellectual advent of realism, post-realism, critical legal studies, and now 
metaprocedure. See, e.g., White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellec-
tual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819 (1986); White, The Inevitability of Critical, Legal Studies, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 649 (1984). See generally H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1972) (especially Appendix B); R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION 
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micians are for the most part (to borrow from the 1960s which nur-
tured this generation of the professoriate) "doing their own thing"; 17 
and the youngest generation to join procedural ranks is - well -
justifiably confused. ls · 
The appearance of Procedure, then, is central to the introspective 
self-searching in which proceduralists are engaged.19 The fiftieth anni-
versary of the Federal Rules prompted a reassessment of their efficacy 
in achieving the stated goals of a ''just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action."20 This milestone has also fueled renewed 
interest in Professor Cover's critique questioning the transubstantive 
nature of the rules.21 Finally, the publication of Procedure has, in ef-
fect, set the procedural debate for years to come by challenging the 
narrow, received tradition of exclusive focus on civil adjudication. 
This is an essay about the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik casebook Proce-
dure. But, more broadly, it is an essay about the larger academic set-
ting that will either embrace or reject the intellectual approach 
embodied in the text. It is an essay about the sea changes currently 
felt across the discipline, where a s~gnificant number of teachers now 
call themselves "proceduralists." This is a series of reflections on the 
import of metaprocedure for the traditional canon and for legal educa-
tion generally. 
The first section of this essay places the theory of meta procedure in 
its historical context. It shows that the development of a broadly con-
ceived understanding of procedure derives from the.realist movement 
at Yale. This section also describes other attempts at realist curricu-
lum and casebook revision and their reception at law schools. With 
lN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s (1983); Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: 
An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968). 
17. At least a half-dozen approaches to procedural scholarship and teaching emerged at the 
AALS Conference. Among these were a pre-clinical or clinical approach; social science and 
empirical studies; critical legal and feminist jurisprudential perspectives; metaprocedure; and the 
traditionalist teaching of civil procedure. For a discussion of these approaches and perspectives, 
see infra notes 29 and 142. , , 
18. This was one of the themes gleaned from the comments of the AALS Conference partici-
pants. While there was general excitement and enthusiasm generated by the various presenta-
tions, junior colleagues expressed dismay and confusion about the possibility of developing any 
unified notion of course content or teaching methodology. Many expressed the view that it was 
difficult to understand how one was supposed to integrate all the approaches, perspectives, and 
methodologies into one' course. 
19. It is interes'ting to l:ontrast the program and agenda of the 1980 Conference on Civil 
Procedure with that of the 1988 Conference. As one professor who was present at both ex-
plaine,d, there was more sense of a "traditional ~non" of civil procedure at the 1980 Conference. 
The only great debate at that Conference was over the most logical ordering of the elements of 
the course. In contrast, at the 1988 Conference there was little discussion or agreement concern-
ing a traditional canon. Indeed, traditionalists seemed unaided by their self-characterization as 
dinosaurs. See H. Fink, Remarks at the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure (June 8, 1988). 
20. FED. R. C1v. P. I. 
21. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Rf!ading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 
718 (1975). 
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this ,background in mind, the second part of the essay describes and 
critiques the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik casebook. The general conclu-
sion is that the authors have presented an exciting, challenging, and 
highly intellectual conception of the discipline. The casebook fills a 
long-standing gap of theoretically undernourished procedure texts.22 
The authors have redefined a field of study; reshaped thinking about 
procedural issues; and recast the dialogue among academic colleagues. 
The ultimate question is whether this revolution will take J;iold or 
whether metaprocedure will pass from the scene as another failed real-
ist attempt at reforming the traditional curriculum. 
Finally, the third section of the essay attempts to assess the impact 
of metaprocedure on the current teaching of civil procedure. Thus, 
apart from its historical roots, metaprocedure is viewed in contempo-
rary context. Here, different approaches to procedural scholarship 
and education are described, raising challenging issues for the integra-
tion of metaprocedure into existing curriculums. Again, the primary 
question is whether metaprocedure can intelligibly be integrated into 
current procedure courses, or whether it requires wholesale curricu-
lum reform in order to be truly appreciated as an intellectual frame-
work for understanding the law. · 
I. REALISM AND PROCEDURE AT YALE 
A. ·The Structure of Procedure: 1979 
Professor Fiss' account of his stroll with Professor Cover provides 
a personal insight into the moment of conception of a revolutionary 
casebook. The gestation of that book, however, was evident with the 
1979 publication of Cover and Fiss' The Structure of Procedure, 23 
which provided signposts to the past and the future of met~procedµre. 
It began with the simple declaration: "We invite you to rethink proce-
dure. "24 Procedure, the casebook, is the fulfillment of the vision ar-
ticulated in The Structure of Procedure. 
_By 1974 Professors Cover and Fiss had begun to move away from 
a model of procedural ~eachip.g that stressed professional tr~ining to-
ward one that explored theoretical and abstract issues. This deliberate 
pedagogical choice eschewed the path taken by many procedure teach-
ers who wanted to tran~form first-year civil procedure into a modified 
clinical course. 25 The authors recognized the impact of the clinical 
22. See Mullenix, User Fri~ndly Civil Procedure: Pragmatic Proceduraiism Slouching Away 
from Process Theory (Book Review), 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1023 (1988). that article lamented 
the dearth of theoretically oriented procedure casebooks and the concomitant trend towards 
more pragmatic teaching materials. Without a doubt, Procedure represents over-correction for 
this gap in the teaching literature. 
23. R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4. 
24. Id. at iii. 
25. Id. at iv. 
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legal education movement of the 1960s,26 yet viewed its development 
"not as a model to be followed, but rather as a source of new opportu-
nities. "27 Thus, at Yale, skills training relating to procedure was rele-
gated to a "side course" supervised by second- and third-year law 
students. 28 
Nonetheless, the path not taken by professors Cover and Fiss 
would-be followed at many law schools where clinical training pro-
vided a model for first-year civil procedure. The development and in-
crease in "pre-clinical" procedure courses attests to the popularity and 
enduring quality of simulated practical experience in the law school 
curriculum. It represents one of the major innovations in procedure 
teaching in the last twenty-five years and has generated a vibrant, vo-
cal, and dedicated academic following. 29 
Professors Cover and Fiss instead took the other road. Freed from 
the burdens of technical rule construction or skill training, the profes-
sors were able "to make the course more analytic, more theoretical" 
and "to devote the major portion of our class discussion and' our peda-
gogic energy to an exploration of the more theoretical issues."30 The 
26. Id. ("Starting in the late 1960s clinical education became a larger part of the Jaw school 
curriculum. Some teachers believed that intense professional activity, whether it be real or simu-
lated, was the most effective way of training lawyers. . . . Clinical education grew, and it had 
important implications for procedure courses ... "). See generally H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, 
supra note 16, at 37-46; R. STEVENS, supra note 16, at 214-16, 240-41. 
27. R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at iv. 
28. Id. The side course made use of various written assignments including pleading exer-
cises, memoranda, briefs and problems on discovery. The authors note that "[s]uch skills are 
important, but they are, in our judgment, most effectively taught in a clinical program or super-
vised work experience: through summer employment or the early years of actual practice, 
through work in a legal aid office, through clinical courses or seminars in trial practice." Id. 
29. Clinicians were a strong contingent at the 1988 Conference on Civil Procedure, where 
they presented various formats for clinical teaching of procedure. See, e.g., L. Anderson, "Inte-
grating Actual Litigation Into a Basic Civil Procedure Course," Remarks at the AALS Confer-
ence on Civil Procedure (June 5, 1988); L. Grosberg & J. Toran, "Use of Buffalo Creek Materials 
in Civil Procedure," Remarks at the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure (June 8, 1988); P. 
Schrag, "Year-long Simulation in a Large Section of Civil Procedure," Remarks at the AALS 
Conference on Civil Procedure (June 8, 1988). Professor Schneider, a former clinician, also 
spoke about the use of clinical applications in the civil procedure course she teaches at Brooklyn 
Law School. See J. Resnik & E. Schneider, "Redefining the Canon: Suggested Materials, Texts, 
and Approaches to Procedure," Remarks at the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure (June 6, 
1988). Many of these proponents have urged clinical teaching methodologies for civil procedure 
courses. See, e.g., Anderson & Kirkwood, Teaching Civil Procedure With the Aid of Local Tort 
Litigation, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215 (1987); Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Proce-
dure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41 (1987); Panel discussion, Clinical Legal Education: Reflections on 
the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations For the Future, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 337 (1987) (state-
ment of Philip Schrag, panel participant); Schrag, Terry White: a Two-Front Negotiation Exer-
cise, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 729 (1986); Downs, Toward Simulation in Legal Education - An 
Experimental Course in Pre-Trial Litigation (Book Review), J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. Dec. 1986, 
at 65. Related to the clinical approaches is a method adopted by a core of professors who use the 
"Buffalo Creek" disaster materials, including G. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 
(1976), as both a unifying theme and opportunity for limited simulated practical skills exercises. 
See, e.g., Grosberg, The Buffalo Creek Disaster: An Effective Supplement to a Conventional Civil 
Procedure Course, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 378 (1987). 
30. R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at iv-v. 
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focus therefore was on an innovative approach to the entire subject of 
procedure. Thus, the label "civil" was dropped and the professors 
urged their students to consider procedure as a unified attribute of law 
that transcends the traditional professional categories - those implied 
by the terms "civil," "criminal," or "administrative."31 
The impetus for this innovation was in large measure supplied by 
the Due Process Revolution of the 1960s;32 various rule reforms of two 
decades;33 and institutional changes including national legal services 
programs, increased use of federal injunctive power, and the growth of 
adjudicatory adjuncts. 34 This dramatic transformation of the legal 
landscape impelled rethinking of the academic teaching of civil 
procedure: 
Rapid and widespread change in legal doctrine and institutions, in our 
conceptions of due process, made intensive training in rulesmanship -
long a primary goal of the first-year civil procedure course - somewhat 
beside the point. The basic propositions, ones that had long lain dor-
mant and unexamined, now demanded attention. Their axiomatic status 
had been called into question. We also realized that such a re-examina-
tion should not be confined by the traditional labels of the law school 
curriculum, those that made a sharp distinction between civil and crimi-
nal procedure. Procedure should no more be a course in the chronology 
of specific kinds of law suits than torts should be a course in claims 
adjustment. 35 
This transubstantive conception of procedure is the central tenet of 
metaprocedure. It is an approach that requires piercing analytical la-
bels to assess the nature, function, and impact of procedural rules on 
justice and fairness. Thus, a discussion of discovery ought not to be 
narrowly focused on civil discovery rules, but should instead examine 
"the more general inquiry into information acquisition and exchange 
in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings."36 This global ap-
proach focuses on different premises, parties, stakes, and outcomes. 
Ultimately, this perspective asks whether such differences "truly mat-
31. Id. at v. 
32. Id. at iii. The authors explained that at least three landmark cases of the Due Process 
Revolution - Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); and 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) - "tested the traditional categories." 
33. The class actions rule (FED. R. C1v. P. 23) was amended in 1966; the discovery rules 
(FED. R. C1v. P. 26-37) were amended in 1970; and the Federal Rules of Evidence became 
effective in 1975. Id. 
34. See R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at iii. In the 1970s, the Legal Services program of 
the Office of Economic Opportunity developed into the Legal Services Corporation. See R. STE-
VENS, supra note 16, at 237. Cover and Fiss also identify the increased use of the injunctive 
power as a tool for social justice (see FED. R. C1v. P. 65), and innovative utilization of the offices 
of special masters as adjuncts to complex litigation (see FED. R. C1v. P. 53). R. STEVENS, supra 
note 16, at 237. 
35. R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at iii. 
36. Id. at iv. 
1146 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1139 
ter[], or matter[] in the way we had been taught."37 
The metaprocedure of the 1980s, then, is the child of the proce-
dural revolution of the 1960s. But it is also the intellectual descendent 
of older educational and philosophical movements. Cover and Fiss 
acknowledge that interdisciplinary legal scholarship also impelled 
them toward a broader conception of procedure. 38 Thus, the develop-
ment of sociological jurisprudence brought social scientists and hu-
manists into the legal arena, and by the 1960s interdisciplinary work 
had broadened perspectives on traditional.legal disciplines. 39 In par-
ticular, economics, philosophy, and history were applied to the sub-
stantive legal disciplines of torts, property, and contracts.40 
Procedure, as a discrete intellectual endeavor, was slower to receive 
such interdisciplinary treatment. 
Interdisciplinary studies also suggeste<:l a methodological frame-
work that was somewhat alien to clinical or traditional doctrinal 
approaches: 
Interdisciplinary work inevitably lessens the'.focus on professional train-
ing, and raises more general theoretical questions. The purpose of much 
of the research is not to improve professional technique, although that is 
often a useful by-product, but rather is to understand why people behave 
the way they do and to guide power wielders in designing institutions or 
formulating rules.41 
Cover and Fiss early established a divide between professional practi-
tioners and academic intellectuals: 
Interdisciplinary work also tends to obliterate the traditional curricula 
categories,. such as "civil," "criminal," and "administrative" procedure. 
While those categories may have a great deal of meaning for the practic-
ing lawyer, they have less significance for the academic inquirer ap-
proaching his task from an analytic, rather than a professional lawyer's 
perspective. 42 
In The Structure of Procedure, then, Yale claimed the intellectual 
high ground for all subsequent debate on procedural matters; profes-
sional skill or technique was merely acknowledged as a "useful by-
product." This perspective was intended to raise the level of inquiry 
and discourse, but it also has contributed, perhaps accidentally, to ·a 
stratification among procedure teachers. After all, when Yale rele-
37. Id. 
38. Id. at v. 
39. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 8. 
40. See R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at v. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. Thus, the authors note: "Harry Kalven and Hans Ziesel were aware that their book, 
The American Jury, pertained only to the criminal jury. For one instant they considered calling 
the book The American Criminal Jury. We suspect 'they chose their title largely because their 
findings on judge/jury divergence transcended the professionally rooted categories - they spoke 
to the jury as a unified institution." Id. 
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gates skills training to a side-course taught by law students, what is the 
rest of academe to think? 
B. The Realist Roots of Metaprocedure 
There can be little doubt that Procedure as a casebook is startling, 
provocative, and challenging - but not innovative. Its conception, 
format, and structure are direct lineal heirs of several attempts, begin-
ning in the. 1930s, at redefining casebook presentation. The fate of 
those casebooks is instructive, suggesting some potential problems for 
the reception of both Procedure and metaprocedure. 
The development of legal realism at Yale, and generally, has been 
often told and well documented.43 It was in large measure a reaction 
to the rigid conceptualization and classification of legal principles, 
without regard to underlying facts, that dominated nineteenth-century 
jurisprudential reform.44 The realist movement embodied a profound 
skepticism concerning language in judicial opinions, and much effort 
was devoted to exposing ambiguities in judicial pronouncements. 
Moreover, linguistic theory raised questions regarding the validity of 
legal categorization.45 An additional ingredient of the realist critique 
derived from contemporary Freudian theories of the unconscious and 
rationalization. For some realists, these notions suggested that judi-
cial opinions reflected the idiosyncratic tendencies of individual 
43. See supra ·note 9; see also G.E. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 
(1978); Dawson, Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 406 (1983); Gilmore, 
Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Purcell, American Jurisprudence 
Between the Wars: Legal Realism.and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424 
(1969); Schlegal, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experi-
ence, 28 BUF,FALO L. REV. 459 (1979); cf. Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. 
REV. 1383; White, supra note ,16; White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurispru-
dence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); 
Woodard, supr<! note 16. 
44. See L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 10-20; Woodard, supra note 16, at 697-703. Of course 
the great systematizers of British law were Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham. In the United 
States, the chief. advocate of considering the study of law a rational science was Christopher 
Columbus Ungdell at Harvard Law School, who concomitantly gave us the Socratic method of 
teaching (°'the case method"). Writes Professor Kalman: 
The conceptualism which functionalism attacked dominated the legal world at the end of 
the nineteenth century iind was particularly.compatible with the post-Darwinian era. Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell, its principle proponent, was an amateur botanist, who classified 
law much as he did plants. As dean of the Hfil"Vard Law School between 1870 and 1895, 
Langdell preached that all law should be reduced to a set of well-categorized rules and 
principles. . • . Langdell based his theory of'education on two postulates, which he described 
in 1886: "first that law is a science; secondly, that all available materials of that science are 
contained in printed books." 
L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
45. See L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 19-20. "Realists also found contemporary linguistic 
theory valuable in their attempts to expose the ambiguity of language in the judicial opinion. 
The realists who read Ogden and Richards's The Meaning of Meaning learned that despite 
words' appa.rently fixed meaning, they could be understood on)y through an examination of their 
ever-changing context." Id. at 19 (citation omitted). This emphasis on contextual knowledge 
would prove central to the subsequent realist casebooks, and to the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik 
Procedure, as well. See text accompanying note 114. 
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judges, rather than a principled-application of legal rules.46 
In reaction to rigid legal classification and the case method ap-
proach to legal training, the realists instead adopted a concept of func-
tionalism as the lodestar of their jurisprudence. This functionalism 
was central to the realist methodology and would spur realists on to 
"create a new geography."47 As Professor Kalman notes: "Central to 
functionalism, as the realists employed it, were a preoccupation with 
'process,' a distrust of precedent, criticism of concepts, the substitution 
of facts for concepts, and a dedication to empiricism."4 8 
Thus the vision of the 1920s realists resonates in the Cover, Fiss, 
and Resnik approach to procedure. For these earliest realists, "[t]heir 
functional approach did not treat subjects of law as abstract entities 
isolated unto themselves."49 For example: 
Realists noted that when scholars actually catalog[u]ed the situations in 
which the trust device was used, trusts would impinge upon property. 
Similarly, the law of partnerships would no longer be separate from the 
law of corporations: there would be a law of business units. Law and 
equity would be merged, as would substantive law and procedure. 50 
It is no great surprise, then, that the realists were "preoccupied with 
procedure" and "tirelessly advocated a new federal civil procedure 
that would merge law and equity."51 Yale's contribution to this mo-
mentous endeavor was Professor Charles E. Clark, who served as the 
senior reporter of the committee that drafted the new rules.52 
The Cover, Fiss, and Resnik conception of metaprocedure echoes 
other attributes of early twentieth-century realism. The realists, utiliz-
ing functionalism as their central methodology, strove to objectify the 
law and reduce subjectivity. Interdisciplinary study and empirical in-
quiry would come to play a major role in legal scholarship and educa-
tion at Yale in ensuing years. A summary of the early realist 
movement also fairly describes the efforts and goals of late twentieth-
century metaproceduralists: 
The realists preached that the law should be studied as part of society; 
they concentrated their attention on facts rather than concepts; they 
spent their time studying law's operations and showing that judges made 
law rather than formulating ethical legal rules or arguing that a higher 
law guided judges; they believed in objectivity and sometimes in reform 
46. "Freud's emphasis on the unconscious and the theory of rationalization had led him to 
treat explanations such as judicial opinions as an ex post facto process of finding legitimate rea· 
sons to justify a decision to which the unconscious had led the individual." L. KALMAN, supra 
note 8, at 20. 
47. Id. at 30. 
48. Id. at 20. 
49. Id. at 30. 
SO. Id. (citations omitted). 
SI. Id. at 21. 
S2. Id. 
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as well; and they all sought to make the subject of their work relevant to 
contemporary practitioners. 53 
Realism at Yale, as an intellectual movement and engine for re-
form, dominated the educational scene in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
movement presented a fundamental challenge to the soul of legal edu-
cation at Harvard, and the clash of these two schools, this incredible 
professional sturm und drang, represents a spectacle now primarily of 
historical interest. It is received wisdom that contemporary law 
schools have embraced much of the realist critique, and that interdis-
ciplinary study as well as empiricism have assiduously invaded the law 
school curriculum. 54 
Other aspects of the realist reform, however, were less successful, 
and insofar as they shed some possible light on the fate of 
metaprocedure, they bear scrutiny. In particular, repeated efforts at 
overarching curriculum revision, along realist lines, have met with 
equally repeated resistance. Similarly, attempts at realist casebooks 
have suffered not only in the marketplace of ideas, but in the 
marketplace. 
C. Realist Reformation of the Curriculum 
If the meta procedural approach hopes to gain a hold upon twenty-
first century legal education, it carries with it implications for the 
traditional first-year curriculum as well as the remainder of law 
school. Although the casebook's authors and its advocates urge that 
Procedure can be easily integrated into existing traditional doctrinal 
approaches, 55 the true metaprocedural agenda is to renovate the law 
school curriculum along functional lines. Procedure integrates issues 
and theories across legal categories and melds together analytical spec-
ulation not only from criminal, civil, ~nd administrative procedure, 
but from constitutional law, federal courts, jurisprudence, and reme-
dies (to mention but a few possibilities). In recasting the subject along 
functional lines rather than according to traditional legal categories, 
Procedure forces questions about inclusion, exclusion, and reaundancy 
in the curriculum. 
S3. Id. at 37-38. Almost all these themes resonate in Procedure. See infra Part II.A. 
S4. "By [1960], Harvard and Yale, which had once professed to offer different styles of legal 
education, had become similar. The realist revolution had proven a palace revolution, which 
replaced the old guard with a very similar hierarchy." L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at xii; see also 
R. STEVENS, supra note 16, at 264-79; Woodard, supra note 16, at 722-32. 
SS. See Resnik, Course Syllabus for Federal Civil Procedure, University of Southern Califor-
nia 1984 Fall Term (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Eskridge, Incorporating Meta Proce-
dure into a Doctrinal Course (unpublished memorandum circulated at AALS Civil Procedure 
Conference, Charlottesville, Virginia, June 7, 1988 (on file with the Michigan Law Review)). The 
Structure of Procedure also included a guide to users with suggestions for integrating the readings 
into the traditional, doctrinal casebooks then available. See R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at 
S22-26 ("A Map for Misreading"). Procedure, of course, does not incorporate similar sugges-
tions for integration into a doctrinal course. 
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History supplies us with at least one example of a wholesale at-
tempt at curricular reform in accord with the realist philosophy. In 
1923, Professor Herman Oliphant of the Columbia University Law 
School wrote a memo to university president Butler urging a revision 
of the law school's curriculum along functional lines, with an empha-
sis on integration of social science into legal research and education. 56 
Oliphant subsequently issued a report that condemned Harvard-style 
Socratic-method case study as "being pretty much out of touch with 
life," and charged that educational methodology "with obscuring the 
social policy behind rules, creating a barrier between law and the so-
cial sciences, and sharpening the dichotomy between substantive law 
and procedure."57 . 
Professor Oliphant and his colleagues envisioned a curriculum or-
ganized along functional lines, into four categories: business relations, 
familial relations, communal political relations~ and law administra-
tion. 58 The last category would encompass broad issues of procedure. 
Between 1926 and 1928, ten faculty committees at Columbia at-
tempted to revise the curriculum in accord with Professor Oliphant's 
suggested fou:i;- divisions. The committee titles embodied the realist · 
philosophy: labor, finance and credit, marketing, form of business 
unit, risk and riskbearing, crimes, family and familial property, legisla-
tion, law administration, and historical and comparative jurispru-
dence. Clearly, "[t]he absence of committees for property, torts, and 
contracts implied that teachers would present material traditionally 
covered in these first-year courses from a radically new perspective."59 
The results were mixed. Functional revision was most successful 
in business-related portions of the curriculum, but jurisprudence was 
the only nonbusiness course affected by the realist rethinking. 60 Some 
committee reports had little impact on the curriculum; "[o]ther com-
mittees were crippled by the doubts of their own members or influen-
tial individqals in the field about the wisdom of the functional 
approach or the integration of law with the social sciences;"61 and 
56. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 69. Professor Oliphant taught trade regulation. He was 
joined by colleagues Professor Dowling (industrial relations) and Professor Underhill Moore 
(commercial law). The three organized their courses around social and economic problems, 
rather than legal doctrine, and integrated tenets of contracts, torts, equity, criminal law, corpora· 
tions, agency, and constitutional law. They also emphasized a variety of nonlegal as well as 
statutory materials. Id. at 68-69. Those themes are all evident in Procedure. See infra Part II.A. 
57. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 70. 
58. Id. at 70-71. 
59. Id. at 71. 
60. Id. at 71-72. Notes Professor Kalman: "The Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence 
Committee's broad conception of jurisprudence as encompassing legal philosophy, ancient law, 
legal history, and comparative law led it to opt for greater attention to research and inclusion in 
the undergraduate law curriculum oflogic, Roman law, and the history of the common law." Id. 
at 72. 
61. Id. 
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"[o]ne committee failed because the faculty as a whole could not ac-
cept the logical implications of revision of the curriculum."62 Thus, in 
a scenario touchingly familiar to any faculty member who has ever 
labored on a curriculum co.mmittee, "[a]t the close of the 1920s, ... 
the functional approach had triumphed only in jurisprudence and 
business-related courses, and everywhere the integratio11 of law with 
the social sciences so crucial to realism remained nothing more than a 
vague ideal. " 63 
A number of reasons have been suggested for the failure of this 
great experiment at realist curriculum reform at Columbia.64 Not 
only did an attempt to revise the entire curriculum prove too ambi-
tious, but the goal of simplifying the curriculum proved elusive. There 
is a certain sense of poignancy, if not deja vu, in reflecting on the Co-
lumbia experience: "Nor had the functional approach always resulted 
in simplification. Its exposure of the overgeneralizations inherent in 
legal principles frequently required more hours than had its conceptu-
alist predecessor. The old -course on corporations becapie three more 
time-consuming courses. "65 
This is a telling critique, with equal import for Procedure. In their 
efforts to avoid the rigid classification of civil procedure, the authors 
have replaced the traditional course with a greatly expanded func-
tional approach. Professor Resnik, at least, has indicated that the text 
is not meant to be utilized in a single course, but contemplates further 
exploration beyond the first-year experience.66 The problem, of 
course, is that, unlike Columbia's well-intentioned venture into func-
tional curriculum revision, meta procedure has been launched into· an 
academic universe that . is not yet functionally reorganized. 
Metaprocedure puts most law schools to a hard choice. Schools must 
receive it sui generis, and the rest of the existing curriculum be 
damned; or they must engage in wholesale curricular reform to ac-
commodate its challenging intellectual framework. 
Procedure is intellectually demanding precisely because it requires 
its readers to think about legal problems across categories. But this 
new approach, ironically, will prove a simpler task for new generations 
of students unschooled in traditional legal classification, writing on the 
62. Id. This was the "Risk and Riskbearing Committee" which proposed a course organized 
around the theme of risk apportionment. It would have drawn on materials and concepts usually 
found in the traditional courses dealing with agency, partnership, corporations, sales, procedure, 
contracts, evidence, property, insurance, and torts. 
63. Id. at 73. 
64. See id. at 73-78; R. STEVENS, supra note 16, at 139-41. 
65. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 73 .. 
66. Conversation with Judith Resnik, AALS Conference on Civil Procedure, Charlottesville, 
Virginia, June 4-9, 1988. The autnors-note in their Preface that "[a] year is needed to complete 
the book" (p. xi), and that the new course in_ metaprocedure "is intended to take the place now 
occupied by first year civil procedure and to serve as an introduction to the advanced curriculum 
in civil, criminal, and administrative procedure" (p. vii). 
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proverbial tabula rasa. For the garden-variety civil procedure teacher 
raised on Pennoyer v. Nejf, 61 Procedure presents a daunting spectre 
indeed. It literally requires reeducation in subjects unexamined since 
law school, and a bent of mind that can capably draw comparisons 
and distinctions across traditional doctrinal classifications. One wor-
ries about the fate of Procedure in the hands of the un-Y aled. 
D. Adventures in Realist Casebooks 
Just as the experience of realist curriculum reform is informative, 
so too is the history of attempts at designing realist casebooks. Again, 
professors at Yale and Columbia took the lead in dramatically rethink-
ing legal education, this time through course presentation. As with 
curriculum reform, the casebook revisers took a total root-and-branch 
approach in discarding existing formats, categories, and doctrinal out-
lines. 68 And as with many startling revolutions prematurely foisted on 
unsuspecting populations, the resulting casebooks failed to gamer cru-
cial support in academic ranks that would have ensured ultimate sur-
vival and vindication. 
Realist casebooks began to appear in the 1920s and 1930s in the 
fields of trade regulation,69 sales,70 property,71 trusts and estates,72 as 
well as trial, judgments, and appeals. 73 Closely hewing to the realist 
perspective, these casebooks attempted to integrate different parts of 
the law school curriculum, and the modem casebook as we know it 
67. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer, of course, is the traditional lead-off case 
for most doctrinal procedure casebooks on the market today, and (perhaps for that reason, 
among others) was much maligned by metaproceduralists and clinicians at the AALS Confer-
ence on Civil Procedure. After three days of constant abuse, Pennoyer was defended by Professor 
Phil Schrag of Georgetown, who noted the interesting historical treatment in Perdue, Sin, Scan-
dal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. 
L. REV. 479 (1987). 
68. Cf L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 78-79. As with curriculum reform, Columbia again 
took the lead with the publication of Karl Llewellyn's Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales 
(1930). Id. 
69. See H. OLIPHANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRADE REGULATION 
(1923). 
70. See K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930). This 
casebook emphasized contract theory rather than property concepts of title, and treated sales as 
"a matter of marketing, as a tool of modem business .... " Id. at xv; see also L. KALMAN, supra 
note 8, at 79. It contained only 108 cases and included more than 600 case digests. It also 
included annotations "about business organization, marketing practices, methods of financing, 
bills of lading, and other functions of business." Id. 
71. See M. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF VENDOR AND PURCHASER 
(1933); A. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (1932). Professor 
Handler's book included, among other things, elements of conveyancing and specific perform-
ance of contracts. Professor Jacobs' text consolidated concepts from several courses in property, 
equity, and contracts. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 81. 
72. See R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND EsTATES (1932-
33). This casebook was an early attempt at combining the subjects of trusts, wills, and estates. 
73. See T. ARNOLD & F. JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND 
APPEALS (1936). 
May 1989] Metaprocedure 1153 
emerged, with cases constituting a smaller percentage of overall text. 
The realists added digests, annotations, statutes, and readings from 
other disciplines. 74 Thus, "[b ]y destroying traditional barriers be-
tween courses and reorganizing course content, the functional ap-
proach sought to align law more closely with life."75 
The second major characteristic of the realist casebooks was their 
approach to traditional doctrine. Although the realists did not aban-
don traditional doctrine, they did seek to reposition the importance of 
doctrinal teaching in overall legal education. Doctrine was viewed as 
subsidiary to factual context, and the realist casebooks endeavored to 
impart to students not only case rules and principles, but the human 
vagaries that also explained judicial decisionmaking. Thus, in the real-
ist casebooks, "[t]he judge's reaction to the factual context of the fu-
ture case might prove equally important" as an articulated statement 
of legal rules, and there was great "concern with factual context and 
human idiosyncracy in addition to legal doctrine .... "76 Traditional 
doctrine, then, was not the end of classroom learning but merely the 
beginning of a broader inquiry into questions of justice. 
The realist casebooks utilized two approaches to organizing legal 
material. The first or "amalgamated" format sought to integrate legal 
issues and principles classified in different subject areas throughout the 
curriculum. This approach was successfully employed in casebooks 
dealing with property77 and trial and appeals.78 The second approach 
was "comparativist," which similarly selected disparate materials 
from across subject areas, but with a view toward comparing legal 
problems and their solutions. Here the aim was to encourage students'. 
to compare the way in which the legal system alternatively solved is-,. 
sues in different areas, and to question the efficacy (and justice) of the , 
system as a whole. 
In the procedure arena, Professor Clark's book, Cases on Pleading 
and Procedure, 19 attempted an integration of topics across the then-1' 
existing procedural horizon: 
The result was a casebook that covered several courses in title only, one ·• 
course that consumed as many or more classroom hours than its several • · 
predecessors .... Clark hoped that his casebook on procedure would ': 
make possible a single course that would replace common law pleading, ''! 
code pleading, equitable remedies, and part of evidence. Had he sue- • ; ' 
ceeded, the student would have been able to compare the relative ease of 
74. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 79. Kalman's work describes in some detail these and 
many other realist casebook attempts in the 1930s. See id. at 78-90. 
75. Id. at 80. 
76. Id. Similarly, Procedure deemphasizes doctrinal development and focuses on contextual 
understanding of legal problems. See infra Parts 11.A.(3) and 11.A.(5). 
77. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 80-81; see casebooks cited supra note 71. 
78. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 80-81; see casebook cited supra note 73. 
79. C. CLARK, supra note 10. 
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code pleading with the trials of pleading at common law and the tribula-
tions of pleading in equity. 80 
Clark's grand design was not successful because his text became hope-
lessly bogged down in its massive, grand conception of procedure. 81 
Time rather than editorial assistance remedied the fundamental 
problem with Clark's casebook. Ironically, it was Professor Clark's 
other great realist effort - the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with 
their transubstantive approach to civil actions - that did more for 
restructuring procedure casebooks than any casebook ever could. In 
particular, the rules' merger of law and equity forced the teaching of 
equity into the background, only to be summoned in the direst of cir-
cumstances, such as the teaching of Shaffer v. Heitner, 82 peculiar 
problems in interlocutory appeal, 83 or the right to trial by jury. 84 Fur-
ther, as. succeeding generations of procedure casebooks· have demon-
strated, the entire history of common law pleading has diminished in 
each new casebook, 85 no doubt to disappear entirely by the twenty-
first century.86 
Clark's casebook effort encountered a further nagging problem 
that bears some relevance for apprehending Cover, Fiss, and Resnik's 
effort. In its comparativist approach, which integrated materials from 
throughout the curriculum, Clark created a kind of Frankenstein's 
monster of a text: 
Clark had estimated that teaching the c_asebook 'Yould take a minimum 
of four or five classroom hours per week for a year. Professor Mechem 
pointed out that in most law schools this p~riod was the equivalent of 
two important courses. Mechem wondered why Clark had not divided 
his materials into two courses and called one Pleading and Procedure 
and the other Equity? "Will not the subject matter of its own weight 
80. L. ~ALMAN, supra note 8, at 82. 
81. [B]ecause Clark emphasized the present, he did not stress common law pleading; the 
first volume centered around code pleading. In the middle of the first volume, a six-hundred 
page sequence on equity began, which developed the same material Walter Wheeler Cook 
had included in his nine-hundred-page equity casebook. As Philip Mechem complained, 
there had been. "no integration, no fusion. The equity materials remain as an undigested 
lump; the only cohesion is that supplied by the binder." 
Id. at 82 (footnote omitted). · 
82. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
83. A fairly sophisticated grasp of the law/equity distinction was required to work one's way 
around the old Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. See Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 
188 (1942); Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). fortunately, perhaps, the 
Supreme Court last Term laid this procedural arcania to rest in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. 
Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988). · 
84. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 
469 (1962). 
85. Compare R. MAGILL & J. CHADBOURN, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1939) 
(compilation of common law pleading cases) with P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CASES AND 
COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION, 629-39 (3d ed. 1983) (ten pages on common 
law pleading). 
86. H. Fink, Remarks at the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure (June 6, 1988) (entitled 
"The Proper Role of History in the Study of Civil Procedure"). 
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break into two such parts?"87 
One fundamental problem with these functional attempts to render 
procedure a unified whole is that they unsparingly demand the atten-
tion of the entire educational endeavor. While it may be true that 
there is never too much of a good thing, there is a certain intellectual 
arrogance in deeming equity, or common law pleading, or the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or metaprocedure to be the good thing. 
Moreover, many law schools discovered that amalgamated and com-
parativist casebooks could not be successfully adopted unless all com-
panion volumes followed. Once adopted, the functionalist path 
required an entire sequence of re~ist texts in order to make sense of 
the overarching framework. 88 And, more germane to Procedure, per-
haps, was the experience of many "dismayed law professors who had 
themselves learned law through the study of legal doctrine."89 
Clearly, the realist texts required reeducation not only in one disci-
pline but in entire uncharted subjects - alien precisely because of the 
curriculum's compartmentalization. Functionalism required both a 
methodology and a breadth of knowledge intimidating to the intellec-
tually insecure. 
The counterpart to professorial inti~dation would prove to be stu-
dent laziness of mind. One can only smile in amused recognition at 
the following lament of Professor Charles Alan Wright in his early 
days of teaching: 
I was spoiled at Yale; ·since everyone I knew there conceded the ridicu-
lousness of conceptualism, I supposed that that devil had been exorcised, 
and that legal realism, in greater or less· degree, was everywhere trium-
phant. I couldri't have been more wrong. From morning to night, I 
fight with my classes, with students in to see me, and with some mem-
bers of the faculty, and all I get from them is: "What was good enough 
for Langdell is good enough for me." Or "It's easy to decide cases. You 
just take the facts and look in the law books and get your answer auto-
matically." Or I will waste a whole class hour going over all the possible 
policy ramifications of a case, and problems of that sort in it, and some-
one is sure to come up after the hour: "Mr. Wright, what is the rule of 
the case?" I find mY.self alternating between an eager determination to 
stand conceptualism on its ear, and a feeling of why the hell am I wast-
ing my tin,ie here. 90. 
87. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 83 (citing Mechem, Book Review, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 
165 (1933)). Kalman also notes two complimentary reviews of Clark's casebook: Van Hecke, 
Book Review, 47liARV. L. REv. 370 (1933), and Atkinson, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 1297 
(1933). 
88. L. KALMAN, suprq note 81 at 94. 
89. "It also fll!strated students who wanted the security of legal principles. Perhaps the idea 
of focusing on fact;; rather than doctrine upset all but the brightest students." fd. 
90. Letter from Yale Law School graduate Charles Alan Wright, then teaching at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School, to Yale Professor Fred Rod.ell (Nov. 9, 1950) (reprinted in L. 
KALMAN, supra note 8, at·95). 
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Ultimately, realist casebooks quietly passed from the educational 
scene because law professors (both realist and traditionalist) failed to 
adopt them in their courses. The greatly vaunted integration of social 
science materials into amalgamated courses failed to gain hold, and at 
least one commentator has suggested that for "all their pretensions," 
the realist casebooks failed to offer much that was new.91 "Although 
they aligned law more closely with life, [the realist casebooks] failed to 
give the aspiring lawyer any method for improving the quality of law 
or life. " 92 
II. PROCEDURE: THE CASEBOOK 
It is against this backdrop of realist revision of textbooks and cur-
ricula that one must consider the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik casebook, 
for it is very much a piece of that movement and educational history. 
The book's structure and aspirations resonate with that past, and its 
problems are anticipated in that history. 
A. Procedure as a Post-Modern Realist Text 
Procedure is not for the faint-hearted civil procedure teacher. The 
first thing that leaps out from the table of contents is the relative 
dearth of appellate cases that constitute the mainstay of most tradi-
tional casebooks. Indeed, in the first 431 pages of the text, only seven 
cases appear.93 Of these seven cases, none report judicial opinions 
usually collected in civil procedure texts. It is not until page 479 that 
one encounters a case familiar to most existing procedure books: Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 94 Further examination 
reveals that in the 1824 pages of materials, roughly seventy-five cases 
are included. Of these, only nineteen (depending on how one catego-
rizes cases) are certifiable old stand-bys recognizable to civil procedure 
teachers.95 Thus, calling Procedure a "casebook" is something of a 
91. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 95. 
92. Id. Among other reasons cited for the failure of the realist casebooks was, ironically, the 
"frequent failure" of the realist professors to adopt the functional approach; and the failure fully 
to integrate the social sciences into law teaching. Id. 
93. The seven cases are, in order of appearance in the text: Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 
U.S. 18 (1981); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967); Chrysler Corp. v. Thayer Plym-
outh Center, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 543 (C.D. Cal. 1969); and Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. 
Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
94. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
95. The nineteen standard civil procedure cases found in conventional casebooks, in order of 
their appearance in Procedure, are: Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463 (1978); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41 (1957); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); 
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misnomer; "notebook" might be more appropriate. Clearly, the au-
thors have eschewed any traditional casebook protocol in favor of 
their own particular pedagogical agenda. 
The importance of material selection is echoed in Procedure. 
Faithful to the realist heritage~ the authors indicate that "[w]e have 
also departed from the often exclusive reliance, typical of many 
casebooks, upon court (usually appellate court) opinions."96 This is 
because teaching through the Langdellian case method fails "to cap-
ture both the complex theoretical problems of procedure and the fasci-
nating dynamics of litigation" (p. xi). According to the authors, true 
appreciation of the theory and practice of procedure is often obscured 
by reading appellate decisions, and thus "the provision of such materi-
als as pleadings, affidavits, transcripts of hearings, lower court opin-
ions, and commentary enable an understanding of the role of the 
lawyer in the procedural system" (p. xi). 
True to this belief, Procedure consists of much more than conven-
tional appellate opinions. Indeed, appellate case reports assume the 
role of bit players on the stage of extensive scholarly commentary. 
The book does yeoman's service in incorporating various litigation 
documents alien to most first-year students, but well over half the 
book is devoted to article excerpts. To invoke a culinary metaphor, 
The Structure of Procedure has been folded into bits of cases, litigation 
documents, and illustrations. In its selection and organization of 
materials, Procedure is the logical outgrowth of realist philosophy and 
is the ultimate realist text on the market today. 
Yet even without the historical framework, Procedure manifestly is 
the progeny of those earlier realist casebook efforts. In at least five 
major respects, Procedure elaborates the same philosophical and peda-
gogical themes as those earlier texts, including (1) functional organiza-
tion, (2) comparativist approach, -(3) contextual understanding, ( 4) 
influences on decisionmaking, and (5) subordination of traditional 
doctrine. Each of these aspects will be discussed below, foll!Jwed by 
an overall assessment of this casebook endeavor. 
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.- Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); and Parklane Hosiery Co. 
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Under the narrowest view, two of these cases (Allstate and Phillips 
Petroleum) are choice-of-law cases rather than traditional procedure opinions. Compare this 
coverage with, for example, J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1985); R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, 
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1984); and J. LANDERS, J. 
MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1988). 
96. P. xi; cf L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 79 (discussing the selection of materials in K. 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 70). 
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1. Functional Organization 
For civil procedure, conceptualism has long dictated a casebook 
format that either follows the course of a typical litigation or pro-
gresses through a study of the Federal Rules of .Civil Procedure.97 
Although Cover, Fiss, and Resnik do not label their approach as such, 
functionalism is the essential organizing principle for the text. Proce-
dure's functional approach eschews narrow rule construction (nuts-
and..:bolts procedure) in favor of broader jurisprudential enquiry. 
Functionalism as a pedagogy permits the authors to take the intellec-
tual high road, an approach clearly anticipated in The Structure of 
Procedure. 98 Thus the authors state: "We might also add that in writ-
ing this book, we have deliberately avoided an organization based 
upon the linear unfolding of a lawsuit or upon a detailed sequential 
examination of all the rules of federal civil, criminal, and administra-
tive procedure. In our view, th[is] pedagogic method fail[s] to capture 
both the complex theoretical problems of procedure and the fascinat-
ing dynamics of litigation" (p. xi). Further, the authors' twin goals 
"are to provide appreciation and insight into both the theory and prac-
tice of procedure - insights often obscured by a linear organization 
... " (p. xi). 
Procedure, then, does not begin where most procedure texts begin. 
The first overarching chapter, "The Value· of Procedure," raises the 
metaquestion, "Why we have process and why we care about the kind 
of process the' law provides" (pp. vii, ·1-37). The centerpiece of this 
chapter is a thorough examination of Goldberg v. Kelly (pp. 37-104), 
Cover and Fiss's "big case" from the que process revolution that pro-
vided the original impetus for rethinking procedure. 
The second theme addresses the "The Forms of Adjudication" (pp. 
180-428), and ~·examines the role of courts and their remedial capaci-
ties" (p. viii). Here a school desegregation case, Hart v. Community 
School Board of Brooklyn, 99 provides the focus for inquiries into "the 
permissible limits of adjudication as a mechanism for societal decision-
97. See casebooks cited supra note 95; see also J. CHADBOURN, A. LEVIN & P. SHUCHMAN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1974) (tracking course of litigation); F. 
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1985) (approximately the same); D. LOU!· 
SELL, G. liAzARD & C. TAIT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE 
AND FEDERAL (5th ed. 1983) (rules orientation); M. ROSENBERG, H. SMIT & H. KORN, ELE· 
MENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1985) (tracking litigation for 
the most part). But see P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COM· 
MENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (3d ed. 1983). This casebook most resembles Proce-
dure in that its chapter divisions are functionally designed, e.g., chapter 1: "Introduction: The 
Social Science of Court Rules"; chapter 2: "Office: The Qualification of Decision Makers"; 
chapter 3: "Jurisdiction: Divisions of Judicial Power"; and so on. It is a casebook that makes 
the greatest attempt to integrate interdisciplinary approaches to procedure, and stresses not only 
judicial decisionmaking, but issues of legal process and economic cost. 
98. See supra n"otes 4, · 23-43, and accompanying text. Many of the chapter headings and 
article excerpts in The Structure of Procedure have been carried forward into Procedure. 
99. 383 F. Supp. 669 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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making" (p. viii). Chapter 3 then explores two topics familiar to fed-
eral courts courses: Who constitutes a proper party to a lawsuit, and 
what constitutes a case? (pp. viii, 428-631 ). 
The fourth functional category is "Strategic Interaction," which 
"shifts the focus from the examination of legal rules about 'the con-
struction of lawsuits to an exploration of the strategic dimensions of 
adjudication" (p. ix). Here the authors "".onsider the pervasive effects 
that the disparate economic and social settings of the parties have on 
litigation" (p. ix, pp. 631-859). The fifth theme involves "The Problem 
of Judgment" (pp ix, 976-1316) and raises various questions concern-
ing "making binding factual and legal decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty" (p. ix). ' 
Chapter 6, "Decision Centers," elaborates on an institutional level 
upon the same problems as chapter 5. Thus, the materials "look be-
yond the question of authority of individual decisionmakers to the in-
stitutional authority of the judiciary" (pp. x, 1316-570). The text here 
deals with broad questions of judicial authority, political legitimacy, 
force and violence, and community - "all potential sources of power 
for courts" (p. x). In this segment the book also broaches issues raised 
by the dual court system., 
The final theme sounded in Procedure is "Anti-Procedure," assur-
edly a catchy chapter heading (pp. x-xi, 1620-787). This is really 
about what everyone else calls res judicata, collateral estoppel, con-
sent, concurrent adjudication, !aches, statutes of limitations, and so 
on. 
2. Comparativist Approach 
A second 'key featµre of many realist casebooks has been a com-
parativist approach utilizing cases and materials from various tradi-
tional fields, with a view toward constructive comparison and critique. 
Unmistakably, a comparativist perspective is central to understanding 
both Procedure and metaprocedure, and is crucial to the authors' ef-
forts to redefine the field. They explain: 
Because the issues central to procedure - the values to be implemented, 
the remedial capacities of courts, the permissible range of party struc-
ture, the reli:ttionship among decision centers - are common to all kinds ,. 
of litigation, we have not limited our concerns to a single context, be it 
civil, criminal or administrative. Rather, our concerns embrace them all. 
This course is intended to take the place now occupied by first year civil 
procedure and to serve as an introduction to the advanced curriculum in 
civil, criminal, and administrative procedure. [p. vii] 
This comparativist approach unfolds throughout the text. The 
opening essay on "the processes of law" introduces students to civil 
actions, criminal actions, administrative proceedings and the various 
institutions involved in legal process (pp. 1-37). Examples abound of 
the comparativist approach. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv-
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ices 100 is utilized as a vehicle for drawing out the procedural implica-
tions of a state-supervised parental rights' termination hearing. The 
Hart desegregation materials provide an opportunity to investigate an 
intervention proceeding (pp. 276-93) as well as to examine the court's 
use of judicial adjuncts such as a special master (pp. 293-311 ). Dunlop 
v. Bachowski 101 is pressed into service to "raise an issue which is a 
theme throughout this course: When do the labels "civil" and "crimi-
nal" attach to a proceeding and what flows from the labeling?" (p. 
581). 
Similarly, several cases are presented to induce discussion of the 
different roles that courts play in the settlement of class actions, major 
antitrust litigation, and criminal actions (pp. 516-37; 589-601; 606-
12).102 The discovery materials, renamed "information in a strategic 
context" (pp. 784-87), range across criminal discovery rules (pp. 788-
93), through the landmark civil discovery cases, Hickman v. Taylor 103 
and Upjohn Company v. United States. 104 
The comparativist approach is not limited to the discrete fields of 
civil, criminal, and administrative procedure. Rather, the book draws 
on a wide spectrum of materials usually encountered in separate 
courses in constitutional law, federal courts, alternative dispute resolu-
tion, complex litigation, conflict oflaws, family law, legal process, pro-
fessional responsibility, law and economics, and remedies. 
In this sense, Procedure greatly resembles the amalgamated realist 
casebooks of the 1930s. There are numerous illustrations. For exam-
ple, the issue of standing, traditionally raised in constitutional law or 
federal courts, is examined in chapter 3's exploration of parties. The 
materials include Sierra Club v. Morton, 105 Davis v. Passman, 106 and 
an article excerpt on standing to challenge administrative action. 107 In 
addition to various materials on settlement (pp. 589-612), several arti-
cle excerpts critically examine alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms.108 Another thematic thread centers on special problems raised 
by complex cases, such as schopl desegregation litigation (pp. 227-
100. 425 U.S. 18 (1981). 
101. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
102. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); and United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 
504 {5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). 
103. 329 U.S. 495 {1947). 
104. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
105. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
106. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
107. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for 
Claims/or Relief. 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974). 
108. In order of their appearance: Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 
53 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1986); Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. 
L. REV. 823 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's 
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse 
May 1989] Metaprocedure 1161 
370); class ·action procedure (pp. 478-514); Agent Orange litigation 
(pp. 337-41); and the AT&T antitrust case (pp. 589-605, 896-920). 
After a very brief exploration of jurisdiction, 109 two traditional 
conflicts cases are presented to illustrate "the strategies of jurisdic-
tion." 110 Domestic relations cases provide a backdrop for probing 
procedural fairness (pp. 134-57) and informal dispute resolution (pp. 
966-75). Finally, extensive readings focus on issues involving legal 
process, 111 professional responsibility, 112 and law and economics.113 
3. Contextual Understanding 
A third major dimension of the realist critique has been an insis-
tence on contextual understanding of cases and judicial opinions. The 
functionalist approach demanded that analysts classify legal problems 
by reference to facts, rather than principles. Contextual understand-
ing is a recurring theme throughout Procedure. Thus, in the Preface, 
the authors acknowledge that their presentation of the Silkwood case is 
accompanied by a short story,114 to "illuminate the contextual vantage 
points of women and men" (p. ix). Similarly, after describi~g the 
materials included in the chapter on "Anti-Procedure," the authors 
comment that "[h]ere, as in all the chapters, the concern is with the 
influence of context on rules, of preferences for and prohibitions 
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 
57 (1984). 
109. See pp. 1434-61. The only personal jurisdiction case excerpted as a major case is World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Pennoyer. International Shoe, and Shaffer 
are all discussed in one long note. Pp. 1434-42. 
110. See pp. 1461-73, discussing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), and Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
111. See, e.g., article excerpts at "The Theoretical Debate," pp. 370-427, including Fuller, 
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 
93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and.the Extraordinary in Institutional 
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); and Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
376 (1976). 
112. See, e.g., excerpts from the AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT; Clermont and Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. 
REv. 529 (1978); Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer 
Effort, 19 LAW & Socv. REV. 251 (1985); Alshuler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and 
the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 149 (1986); a note entitled "Attor-, 
ney-Client Tensions in the Provision of Civil Legal Services"; J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: 
INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS (1983); and Fedders & Guttenplan, Docu-
ment Retention and Destruction: Practical, Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 5 (1980). 
113. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1975); Galanter, Why The "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & Socv. REV. 95 (1974); Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of 
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical 
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 
(1982); see also, article excerpts on "Risks of Inference," pp. 1081-120, including Tribe, Trial by 
Mathematics, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). 
114. Pp. 1168-85 (S. Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers). 
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against repetitive litigation linked to specific genres of litigation and to 
views of the moral worthiness of certain categories of litigants" (p. xi). 
Cases are not presented simply as appellate decisions leaping full-
blown from the brow of the judicial system. Great care has been taken 
to demonstrate the process of dispute resolution from beginning to end 
and to illustrate the entire process of individual and group interaction 
with the legal system. Thus, seventy-five pages are devoted to the 
Goldberg v. Kelly litigation, including its docket sheet, to show the 
development of that litigation and ultimate vindication of individual 
rights (pp. 37-112). This methodology is repeated with the Hart 
school desegregation case, which includes a note on "the cast of play-
ers" (pp. 271-73): The authors also have taken great care to humanize 
the legal process. For example, the story of the efforts of Gary Gil-
more's niother to prevent her son's execution is utilized to illustrate 
the problem· of party participation (pp. 429-36). Similarly, the jury 
deliberation process in the Silkwood case is examined contextually 
through attorney Gary Spence's closing argument, the judge's instruc-
tions, the settlement, artd related judicial opinions (pp. 976-1081). 
Finally, a minor though philosophically important point made 
throughout the text is the use of the full names of all parties in case 
captions, a novelty for law texts. 115 This is repeated for article ex-
cerpts, where authors receive full-name recognition for their contribu-
tion to legal analysis. The point is that real, live people are involved in 
cases and articles; a fact sometimes obscured in more traditional aca-
demic approaches to the law. Thus, Procedure insisten.tly reminds stu-
dents that people, including professors, count. · 
4. Influences on Decisfonmaking 
Closely related to the realists' concern with contextual understand-
ing of the legal proc;ess was their emphasis on the social and psycho-, 
logical dimensions of the law. Thus, theories and concepts were 
borrowed from anthropology, history, sociology, economics, psychol-
ogy and linguistics to· illuminate legal process. 116 Likewise, this theme 
is sounded throughout Procedure: "We evaluate how legal rules re-
spond to the ways in which human judgment is affected by social and 
psychological biases. The issue is whether we can structure legitimate 
procedures within a society permeated by race, class and gender divi-
sions" (p. x). 
Procedure relies heavily on interdisciplinary scholarship, literature, 
and other studies to flesh out the broad implications of complex legal 
problems. Materials for the Silkwood case therefore include "summa-
ries of psychological literature that discuss systematic errors in cogni-
115. Apparently, this was achieved not without some great resistance from the book pub-
lisher. Remarks of J. Resnik, supra note 15. 
116. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
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tion" (pp. ix, 1081). Frequently case reports are followed by article 
excerpts that discuss the economic, social and psychological costs of 
dispute resolution. 117 Such mundane documents as the statistical .re-
port of state court caseloads are included to supply students with basic 
empirical data concerning the efficacy of process (pp. 209-212). 
Traditional interdisciplinary studies are joined by other less ortho-
dox materials one would not expect to find in a law school casebook. 
For example, an excerpt from James B. Stewart's The Partners 118 is 
included to provide a lively narrative background to the famous Dono-
van, Leisure episode relating to document discovery in the Berkey 
Photo case (pp. 860-7 6) .. Another thread throughout the text explores 
how "the images and myths of justice may help us understand what 
aspirations we hold for those who render judgment" (pp. 1229, 1229-
32, 1316-22), and, consistent with this thesis, Procedure also inter-
sperses its text with photo illustrations (frontispiece; pp. 80, 269, 454, 
780). Thus, through its innovative collection of materials, Procedure 
induces its students to think more broadly about the influences on . 
legal process. · 
5. Subordination of Traditional /)octrine 
The realist movement also expressed a profound skepticism about 
the role of doctrine in judicial decisionmaking, and as a consequence, · 
realist casebooks have downplayed doctrinal development. The real-
ists believed that emphasis on doctrinal teaching was misguided, be-
cause attention to legal principles tended to "oversimplify" problems. 
This approach therefore would leave students "'ignorant of the fact 
that they will be concerned with judges who behave as human beings 
in deciding cases' and tended 'to overstimulate [students] with confi-
dence that a deduction from what judges said in one case with its set-
ting can be used to fix what they will decide in another case.' " 119 The 
rejection of doctrinal teaching is implicit and explicit in Procedure. In 
the Preface the authors note that their effort "is not to provide a defin-
itive account of the current state of the law but to enable a sustained 
analysis of the essential theoretical issues to be faced - whatever their 
transitory resolutions may be" (p. vii). Again, a perusal of the table of 
contents immediately suggests that the authors are not concerned with ... 
117. For example, consider chapter VI, "DeCision Centers and Their Authority," pp. 1316- . 
569, which includes a hijacking case, United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 
1979), and excerpts from articles by Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 
Capital Univ. L. Rev. 179 (1985); The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639 (1981); Doo, Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American 
Communities, 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 627 (1973); and Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Reso-
lution, 88 Yale L.J. 916 (1979). 
118. J. STUART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS 327 
(1983). 
119. L. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 79-80 (quoting Sturges, Book Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
510, 513 (1931)). 
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traditional doctrinal development in civil procedure, or any of the 
other discrete subjects that constitute the core of the text. 
For example, the problem of jurisdiction - which consumes much 
of traditional casebook content120 - is covered through exactly one 
case report of World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson. 121 The authors 
present the high points of jurisdiction through a note on Pennoyer, 
Harris, and International Shoe (pp. 1434-42). Other personal jurisdic-
tion cases reported in traditional texts are reduced to annotations (pp. 
1456-61). Shaffer v. Heitner, 122 a central doctrinal piece of the per-
sonal jurisdiction puzzle, is mentioned microscopically (pp. 1441, 
1442), and only reappears in the report of Justice Brennan's dissent in 
World Wide Volkswagen (pp. 1452, 1453). From this textbook treat-
ment students will not have a clue what Shaffer is all about, or why it 
is significant. Similarly, the Erie doctrine is presented through two 
cases: Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins 123 and Hanna v. 
Plumer. 124 The authors are simply unconcerned with the doctrinal 
unfolding of Erie nuances through cases, and no doubt this nontreat-
ment of major Supreme Court opinions will prove shocking to the sen-
sibilities of traditionalists. 
Procedure simply does not purport to develop doctrine. Thus, 
while the authors are very interested in the problem of intervention 
(pp. 275-93, 545-49), there is virtually no corresponding attention paid 
to problems relating to impleader, necessary and indispensable parties, 
real party in interest, the relationship of joinder to jurisdiction, or ma-
nipulation of joinder rules to create or defeat jurisdiction. Although 
the authors pay unusual attention to the problem of the government as 
a party to a lawsuit (pp. 537-612) and to constitutional standing re-
quirements (pp. 446-78), they nearly ignore the requirements of fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction.125 Indeed, it seems somewhat difficult 
to ascertain how students are to divine very much at all about jurisdic-
tion from these materials. Venue, transfer, forum non conveniens, re-
moval jurisdiction: all these conventional procedure topics are not 
systematically presented through rules and cases, 126 but rather are to 
120. See, e.g., J. CoUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, supra note 95, at 64-
320; J. LANDERS, J. MARTIN & s. YEAZELL, supra note 95, at 61-224. 
121. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
122. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
123. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
124. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
125. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is generally discussed at pp. 1434-35. Diversity juris-
diction is presented in bits and pieces at pp. 183, 189, 614, 616, 1435, and 1455. Federal question 
jurisdiction is noted at pp. 168, 1434, 1455. Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, on the 
other hand, commands a whopping eight consecutive page treatment (pp. 1364-72). 
126. Venue is treated as a transfer problem at pp. 1712-13, and as a multidistrict litigation 
issue at p. 1707. The textbook index indicates that the doctrine of forum nan canveniens is 
treated at pp. 1434-42, but these eight pages are the ones outlining Pennayer, Harris, lntema-
tianal Shae, and Shaffer. However, the index does, under forum nan canveniens, indicate "see 
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be learned contextually or interstitially through other materials in the 
book. 
Finally, just as the list of materials included in Procedure is impres-
sive, so too, is the list of what is left out. 127 Noteworthy is the com-
plete nontreatment of pleading, including the total banishment of 
historical discussion of common law pleading and the nineteenth-cen-
tury legal reform movements .. 128 Although a complaint is supplied 
with the Goldberg v. Kelly materials (pp. 61-72), one wonders if it is 
expected to shoulder the burden of teaching proper pleading to first-
year students. This absence of pleading theory is an unusual omission 
for a text so avowedly interdisciplinary and contextual; history appar-
ently does not matter in the same sense as economics or psychology. 
B. Critiquing Procedure 
Critical review is a tricky business. It seems unfair to compare a 
Kandinsky to a Rembrandt and to find the Kandinsky wanting; the 
Kandinsky needs to be judged on its own or some other terms. So, 
too, with Procedure, which deliberately sets out to be unlike existing 
casebooks and certainly succeeds. How, then, is one to assess this 
effort? 
At a minimum, it is possible to draw upon the criticism and the 
fate of earlier realist casebooks in thinking about Procedure, and, in-
deed, many of the problems noted by past· critics bear relevance for 
this casebook endeavor. For example,· the sheer massiveness that 
plagued Professor Clark's casebook haunts Procedure. It is an awe-
some book. Just as Professor Clark became hopelessly bogged down 
in a six-hundred page treatment of equity, Cover, Fiss, and Resnik, 
with their "big case" pedagogy, spend almost 425 pages fleshing out 
the policy and procedural nuances of just two cases, Goldberg v. Kelly 
and Hart v. Community Board. This approach may succeed if a char-
ismatic teacher leads the way, but one suspects that some students, 
with the typical wisdom and patience of youth, will be yearning for the 
professor to get on with it. 
Professor Clark prematurely attempted to merge law and equity in 
his casebook, but time and events proved him essentially correct. Pro-, 
also jurisdiction; venue." The entire text does not mention either Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 
U.S. 501 (1947) or Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). There is also no treatment 
of removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The text index inexplicably refers users to pp. 
182-85, a case dealing with preliminary inju~ctions. 
127. See supra note 126; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (impleader); FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (mechan-
ics of giving notice); FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (joinder of claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (necessary and 
indispensable parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the 
verdict); and FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (default judgments). None of these topics are treated in any 
systematic, doctrinal fashion. 
128. Cf J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, supra note 95, at 386-567; J. 
LANDERS, J. MARTIN&. s. YEAZELL, supra note 95, at 347-467; M. ROSENBERG, H. SMIT & H. 
KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 594-684 (4th ed. 1985). 
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fessor Resnik has prophesized that in the twenty-first century law stu-
dents will look back on the division between civil, criminal, and 
administrative procedure as an arbitrary, if not quaint anachronism. 129 
Nonetheless, the comparativist approach central to Procedure raises a 
number of questions. 
It is somewhat apparent that in trying to do too much, the text 
succeeds in doing many things superficially but nothing really well. 
The text does provide an introduction to a number of loosely related 
concepts but only in a basic, introductory way for a survey course of 
procedure, or more appropriately, a survey course in legal process. In 
this regard, Procedure resembles not so much any legal casebook on 
the market as it does Palmer's History of The Modern World, 130 or 
Samuelson's Economics. 131 Its likely companion volume, surely to fol-
low from Yale, will be Substance. By a peculiar irony, if a student 
wanted to learn particular procedure, then this text forces the student 
to take an "advanced" course in, say, civil procedure. 
Moreover, one must accept an entire array of pedagogical assump-
tions if this book is to work. For example, one must agree that the 
"big case" approach is an effective vehicle to teach policy and doc-
trine; one must agree that the reasonably literate law professor can 
teach these comprehensive materials well; and one must agree that 
rule parsing and doctrinal development are subordinate skills that may 
be gleaned through contextual learning. 
The disparate, voluminous materials in Procedure also give rise to 
a coverage problem that was evident in Professor Clark's predecessor 
text. The authors here admit that Procedure is to be taught over an 
entire year, but there is no suggestion relating to short courses. This 
puts the professor of the four-credit course to extremely hard choices. 
Institutional requirements that compel intellectual triage suggest inter-
esting possibilities for streamlining Procedure. One approach would 
be to eliminate all the materials on criminal and administrative law, 
focusing on the civil litigation aspects of the text. Another possibility 
would be to eliminate the collateral readings, focusing on the cases. 
Obviously, both approaches eviscerate the overarching conception of 
the book .. 
The criticism of the realist casebooks as ahistorical and insuffi-
ciently doctrinal applies with equal force to Procedure. The message 
here is that any student can pick up doctrine (the "they can get it at 
the bar review" mentaUty), but that students really need to discover, 
dissect, and, debate policy and process. In this manner, Procedure is a 
gross over-correction to the increasingly pragmatic casebooks that do 
129. Resnik, Redefining The Canon: Suggested Materials, Texts, and Approaches to Proce· 
dure (Remarks to AALS Conference on Civil Procedure, Charlottesville, Virginia, June 6, 1988). 
130. R.R. PALMER, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD (Jd ed. 196~). 
131. P. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMICS (7th ed. _1967). 
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little else but present pre-digested doctrine.132 If some casebooks fail 
to teach procedure because the texts spell out too much doctrine, then 
Procedure errs in the opposite· direction by spelling out practically no 
doctrine. 
Both species of casebooks, the overly simplistic and the overly the-
oretical, miss the point. The ultimate goal of doctrinal teaching is not, 
after all, merely to teach a set of rules and principles. The reason for 
requiring students to work through a series of cases is to educate the 
student in the cognitive process of getting from here to there. The 
purpose is to teach comparison, distinction, inductive and deductive 
reasoning, analogy, fallacious assumptions and conclusions, dicta, and 
a dozen other legal concepts. The purpose of doctrinal teaching is to 
induce students to understand the importance of facts and the rela-
tionship of facts to rules and principles. A text that digests cases and 
offers black-letter summaries of doctrine short-circuits the pedagogical 
goal of encouraging students to puzzle these things out for themselves. 
Similarly, a text wit~ an overemphasis on commentary, policy, and 
process never requires the student to struggle with the original source 
material of the law; instead, student analysis and critique must largely 
be based on selected secondary source material. 
Moreover, both types of casebooks fail to teach students the skills 
that practicing attorneys and judges utilize every day:· skills of fa,ct 
analysis, case and statutory research, and the applicatfon of facts to 
the law. Relegating "skills" training to a side course does not accom-
plish this task either. Simply put, the kinds of technical skills required 
for drafting a complaint or motion are quite different from the skills 
required to read a series of cases intelligently. The authors of Proce-
dure do not believe that appellate decisions are all that important ( cer-
tainly not series of cases), and so they use cases sparingly, as vehicles 
for raising theoretical discussions about larger process and justice 
questions. The students. thus learn legal process at the expense of legal 
reasoning. 
The absence of any historical referent in Procedure is likewise as 
controversial as it was for the realist texts of the 1930s. ·Except for a 
piece added at the very end (pp. 1814-24); the casebook presents no 
discussion of the British heritage of the American rules of civil proce-
dure. Professor Fink's prophesy that English common law pleading . 
would disappear from future casebooks is with us now. Even the most 
innovative and theoretical text Oil" procedure, Carrington and Bab-
cock's CM! Procedure: Cases and Comments on the Process of Adjudi-
cation, includes a ten-page essay on the history of pl_eading.133 
The flip· side of this ahistorical approach is an overweening pres-
132. See, e.g., D. CRUMP, W. DORSANEO, 0. CHASE & R. PERSCHBACHER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1987), reviewed in· Mullenix, supra note 22. 
133. P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, supra note 97, at 629-39. 
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ent-ism typical of realist casebooks. With the exception of the invoca-
tion of a few old venerables such as Pennoyer v. Neff, the focus here is 
on selected litigation problems of the post-1960 era. The stuff of dis-
pute resolution is welfare rights, school desegregation, the death pen-
alty, and environmental injury. The text gives very little sense of the 
earlier procedural universe and the disputes that forged many of the 
contemporary rules. This absence of history renders the transubstan-
tive critique as a cheap shot at the rules. It is easy, from the perspec-
tive of the 1980s, to declare the rules ineffective for a variety of 
contemporary legal problems. But history teaches that the rules were 
drafted in their time for the legal problems of that day, and the draft-
ers (well intentioned as they were) could not have anticipated late 
twentieth-century litigation nor the implications of modem technology 
for dispute resolution. 
Two other problems of the realist casebooks are also relevant for 
Procedure. Both then and now, theoretical casebooks tend to appeal 
to the brightest professors of the brightest students at the brightest law 
schools. This is not a criticism of the endeavor, but it hints at a prob-
lem of educational elitism on the one hand and militant student con-
sumerism on the other. 134 As was suggested earlier, metaprocedure 
needs to succeed not only in the marketplace of ideas, but in the eco-
nomic marketplace, as well. 
The final dilemma confronting Procedure is that it is competing in 
an increasingly pluralistic educational environment. The realists had 
only to convert their traditionalist Langdellian colleagues; 
metaproceduralists, on the contrary, must integrate their approach 
into courses and curricula populated with traditionalists, social scien-
tists, clinicians, and others. This raises a number of evident questions: 
is metaprocedure an all-or-nothing pedagogy, or can it be integrated 
into an otherwise conventional civil procedure course? If meta-
procedure must stand alone, what implications does this raise for the 
rest of the first-year curriculum and advanced courses? And, ulti-
mately, with the reigning pluralism in legal education, will 
metaprocedure sell? 
III. THE FUTURE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE CURRICULUM: 
A CODA135 
The articulation and advocacy of meta procedure at the Conference 
on Civil Procedure generated a good deal of excitement, interest, and 
debate. 136 The metaproceduralists portentously opened the conference 
134. See D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumer· 
ism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 485-86 {1987). 
135. This was the title of the final session of the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure, June 
9, 1988. 
136. See Eskridge, Resnik, supra note 15. 
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and seized the high ground, with Professor Eskridge presenting a talk 
on "The Importance of Theory in Teaching Civil Procedure,"137 and 
Professor Resnik calling for "Redefining the Canon."138 Perhaps 
sounding a lugubrious note for all civil procedure teachers, Professor 
Eskridge pronounced that "[t]he traditional course is boring to the 
vast majority oflaw students, and to many professors as well."139 He 
went on to suggest that there were at least two ways "thoughtful law 
professors have jazzed up the course."140 The first method utilized 
various clinical approaches, and the second alternative "eschew[ed] 
not only the historical material of the traditional approach, but also 
the how-to-do-it material of the pre-clinical approach. The focus is 
nonhistorical theory and expanded perspective."141 
Professor Eskridge sketched the procedural landscape in contem-
porary law school curriculums and was followed by advocates for 
teaching procedure from different perspectives, methodologies, and 
approaches.142 The common thread, however, was that the traditional 
137. Eskridge, supra note 15. 
138. Resnik, supra note 15. 
139. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 25. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. He articulated his conception of metaprocedure: 
This theoretical approach ... treats "adjudication" as a phenomenon to be explored as a 
purely intellectual endeavor. It asks the "big questions" and subjects adjudication to scru-
tiny and criticism from the perspectives of political theory, ethics, philosophy, sociology, 
anthropology. It examines such issues as the role or value of procedure in our culture and 
the nature of fairness: the relationship of procedure to substantive issues, especially issues of 
social justice; formal modeling of adjudication, as part of an institutional dispute resolution 
continuum; alternative conceptions of adjudication, drawn from comparative systems and 
public interest litigation; and the ideological and philosophical dimensions of the adversary 
focus of our system of adjudication. 
Along with this description of the "intellectual" approach to procedure, Professor Eskridge out-
lined a sociology of the field: 
The theoretical approach tends to disdain the historical evolution oflegal rules·and doctrine. 
It does not disdain the how-to-do-it skills of the pre-clinical approach, but it argues that 
those skills should be left to a real clinical course and/ or developed through extra drafting 
exercises in civil procedure (with little class time spent on them). The forthcoming casebook 
by the late Bob Cover, Owen Fiss, and Judy Resnik will be the classic book for this theoreti-
cal approach. 
Id. 
142. Clinical approaches were demonstrated by Professors Anderson, Schneider, Grosberg, 
and Schrag. See supra note 29. Professor Paul Spiegelman argued for an increased role for 
alternative dispute resolution in the basic course. See Remarks, "The Role of ADR in First-Year 
Procedure," AALS Conference on Civil Procedure (June 5, 1988); cf Spiegelman, Integrating 
Doctrine, Theory, and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: the Logic of Jake's Ladder in the 
Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1988). Professors Walker and Rosenberg spoke 
on the role of social science research and empirical studies in civil procedure teaching. See Re-
marks, "Civil Procedure and Other Disciplines" (June 6, 1988). For more general discussions of 
the effect of social science on the law, see E.A. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); W. LoH, SOCIAL REsEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, 
READINGS AND 1'E.xr (1984); J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (1985); M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE Jus-
TICE (1964); Bersoff, Social Science Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 52 (1987); Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 
ARIZ. L. REV. 51 (1988); Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and 
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course is soporific, with Pennoyer v. Neff vilified as the quintessential 
evil of the traditional course (rivaled only by those dull, dull sections 
on common law pleading). For many brief, shining moments, 
metaproceduralists, social scientists, feminists, empiricists, clinicians, 
and alternative dispute resolution advocates united in the belief that 
civil procedure desperately requires jazzing up. Thus, conferees saw 
the enemy and it was student boredom. This very notion is enough to 
send traditionalists into seizures of Bloomian despair. 143 
Metaprocedure, as well as the other innovative approaches to 
teaching civil procedure, does ameliorate ennui; the ultimate question, 
of course, is at what price. Traditionalists obviously will lament the 
end of tradition and th~ loss of pedagogical values associated with doc-
trinal teaching. Enthusiasts of legal history will mourn the disappear-
ance of certain annals of intellectual history and perhaps note 
Santayana's famous epigram. 144 If the clinicians and metaprocedural-
ists do successfully take the field, then skills training (at one polar end) 
and theory (at the other) will dominate courses of the future. And in · 
curious, mirror-like fashion, both pedagogies will sacrifice legal rea-
soning to technical skills and legal process. 
What is the future of metaprocedure? Metaprocedure will take 
hold at Yale, at the other prestige law schools, and wherever Yale 
graduates teach. It will take hold among the best and the brightest. 
Perhaps that is the ultimate tribute to Procedure. Nonetheless, there 
remains the nagging sense that Procedure is, well, hopelessly snobbish. 
Some such pedantry in defense of intellectual endeavor is no vice; but 
this elitism in defense of metaprocedure is no virtue. 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986). Traditionalists were repre-
sented by Professor Marcus, who expressed misgivings about the role of ADR in the basic 
course, see Remarks, "Some Cautionary Notes on ADR in the First Year Civil Procedure 
Course" (June 5, 1988), and Professor Fink, who spoke on "The Proper Role of History in the 
Study of Civil Procedure," see Remarks (June 6, 1988). 
143. See generally A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987). 
144. To wit, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." G. 
SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284 (1929) (vol. I of THE LIFE OF REASON). 
